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The exceptional performance of the US economy throughout the '90s,
notably characterized by inflation-free high growth, a buoyant job market
and higher asset prices, has led economists to successively examine the
New Economy phenomenon, the reality of its favourable effects and the
risks that it engenders. At the heart of these three considerations lies the
negative and positive role that the new requirements for financing growth
may play, and those of the New Economy more particularly. However, it
would be a good idea to know exactly what we are talking about when we
refer to the "New Economy" since this concept is still unclear. 
We are able to identify four mechanisms that characterize the New
Economy, or at least as far as this subject is concerned:
- the balance between supply and demand for new goods and services
which stimulates growth;
- the increase in productivity gains enabling higher growth with zero-
inflation;
- the difficult task of estimating the value of companies producing these
new goods and services in a macro-economic context that encourages
asset prices to rise and generates financial imbalance;
- the need for an extremely large amount of savings to finance
investment in new technologies and a new way of allocating these
financial resources, focused on the deployment of new networks, and on
telecommunications in particular. This kind of fund allotment is risky
because no one knows how profitable these new investments will prove
to be in the future. 
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New Economy, for two reasons: the problem of rating value and that of
accumulating too many hazardous investments. These spell risk for the
New Economy and as a consequence, risk for growth. This leads us to
examine the links between new growth, New Economy, new methods of
financing and new methods of financing specific to the New Economy. 
If we wish to be rigorous, the question of financing the New Economy
and its impact on growth clearly requires us to differentiate these four terms
by trying to specifically relate growth and the New Economy, as shown in
the following diagram. 
New growth New methods of financing
New Economy        New methods of financing the New Economy 
We will be coming back to these definitions in the first part of our paper
for this purpose, since the terms we have used cover concepts which mean
very different things to different people. This clarification exercise will also
enable us to identify some of the kinds of interaction that exist between the
various elements and, above all, allow us to highlight the existence of a
method of financing specific to the New Economy. 
In the second part of our work we will attempt to outline answers
provided by economic growth theory on the way in which the financing of
the New Economy can have an effect on growth. Since productivity has
been identified as the key source of expansion, we will be looking to find
out whether the financing of the New Economy enables increased
productivity and whether such a gain can justify the level of asset valuation
in this sector. 
More generally speaking, however, the question of justifying profitability
requirements specific to the New Economy sector calls for a quantification
of the risks looming over it. This means adopting a stance vis-à-vis the way
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presenting economists' divergent analyses in the third part, before giving
our own conclusions and showing how real the financial and economic risks
actually are. 
  The New Economy and the Specific Nature of its
Financing 
New Economy and new growth 
It is difficult to give a precise definition of the New Economy because it
actually covers two different concepts. To begin with, the New Economy
designates the aggregate of firms comprising the new information and
communication technologies sector (ICT). In a report commissioned by the
French Ministry of Finance and Industry, BIPE (2000), a market research
and consultancy firm, considers that the economy "is divided into two major
sectors": the new ICT sector and the non-ICT sector. The line of
demarcation between these two sectors is clearly difficult to establish and
Bipe chiefly draws upon the OECD system of classification in this case,
leading to its definition of new ICTs as "activities which produce goods and
services supporting the economy's digitization process". This sector
therefore includes the people producing new technologies, and to a certain
extent, those using them. 
The boundaries of the new ICT sector are still difficult to distinguish.
Nevertheless, on the basis of official categorizations, particularly the one
devised by the OECD, we are able to identify the main lines of business
making up this sector, - namely, computing, electronics and
telecommunications - embracing both productive activity and related
services.
However, in a much more general manner, the New Economy is also the
expression of a new economic model. The US's economic performance
over these last few years, mirrored by identical trends in a few other OECD
countries, is characterized by high growth with zero-inflation, a low
unemployment rate, the fast expanding role of new ICTs and ever-high
market valuations, especially in the hi-tech sectors. These amount to "a
combination of factors which make us feel that a fundamental change has
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and Banking Studies Department at the French National Crédit Agricole
Bank, said:
"The performance shown by the American economy may mean that a new
model of economic and social organization has been created, indicating veritable
structural changes".
No consensus has been reached on how these changes should be
interpreted, however. 
The theory of economic cycles and limitless growth upheld by certain
economists (1) is still strongly contested, in particular, because it cannot be
backed by current data. 
The United States has actually been enjoying rapid and sustainable
growth since 1995. GDP rose at an average annual rate of 4% between
1995 and 1999 (2). For a long time, this growth in the US was seen to be a
cyclical upturn amidst extremely favourable circumstances (rise of the $
and drop in the price of raw materials limiting inflation, combined with a
shrewd monetary policy), but it far outlasted the predictions of "classic"
economic theory. In fact, as we advanced in the cycle, we saw that a
number of the indicators that we had expected to fall, like GDP most
notably, continued to climb. 
A debate about this new growth and where it originated from was
sparked off among economists, focusing more specifically on the portion of
this new growth that can be attributed to the New Economy. Economists
such as JORGENSON & STIRIOH (2000) or Cohen (COHEN & DEBONNEUIL,
2000), all share the view that the development of new ICTs only roughly
explains half of this expansion.
This lack of consensus on a definition of the New Economy is important
in sofaras the way that we explain the New Economy sheds a different light
on the role of financing. Are we talking about  new ICT-specific financing or
more generally, about a series of upheavals that the financial sphere has
experienced over the last decade? 
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(1) We can notably cite the economist Stephen S. ROACH and the chief editor of Business
Week, Stephen B. SHEPARD.
(2) Source Datastream.Are there any new methods of financing?
Financial systems have been undergoing a radical transformation these
past few years, which has shaken up economic methods of financing. This
evolution chiefly originated from an absolutely remarkable economic situation
combining economic and financial variables, notably the liberalization of
financial markets and the demographic shock effect. 
Among the most significant financial developments, we can cite the
increase in the number of non-bank lenders, the development of stock
options and microloans, the great surge of venture capital… and, above all,
the prominent role played by financial markets and the way that their
characteristics have evolved. 
We know how much the expansion and the opening-up of financial
markets have enabled stock exchanges to grow in importance at the
expense of the banking system. Firms are now turning more and more
frequently to equity markets to obtain capital by means of initial public
offerings (IPOs) and by issuing stock as well as bonds. 
This trend was amplified by the creation of secondary stock markets
(NASDAQ, EASDAQ the Nouveau Marché in Paris, etc.). NASDAQ, which
initially set out to be a solution for funding small, fast-developing enterprises
that did not meet other markets' criteria, is now becoming an ever-growing
source of capital and is extending its reach to other categories of companies.
Moreover, the combined impact of the financial and demographic shock
has given rise to tax incentives to constitute capitalization-based pensions,
programmes to encourage save-as-you-earn (SAYE) schemes and
employee shareholding. This phenomenon has had two important
consequences. 
To begin with, American households reallocated a massive portion of their
assets, giving greater precedence to corporate shares (30% of their net
wealth) (3). Baby boomers notably bought (either directly or indirectly through
investment funds in particular) an enormous amount of shares to finance
their retirement. What's more, institutional investors (mutual funds, retirement
funds, etc.) have now become the key players in financial markets. Year-end
1999, they managed around $3100 billion in the US via mutual funds alone. 
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(3) Source: Fed.The fact that individuals have been replaced by institutional investors
with higher demands for profitability has increased the return on equity
(ROE). Since the gap between ROE and interest rates had considerably
widened, firms responded by increasing their leverage given that credit was
granted far more easily. This combination of factors brought about the rise
in asset prices. 
Easier access to financial markets can thus be observed, along with the
tremendous flow of private capital and the prominent role played by
institutional investors. All of these factors create a macro-economic
environment that is conducive to the surge in asset prices. 
However, this phenomenon has obviously had an impact on New
Economy firms in particular. 
Why? Because this increase concerned the price of assets with an
uncertain value, in other words, medium-term profitability was difficult to
gauge. Anything can happen when you take into account these estimation
problems, which is why the price earning ratio (PER) of companies in the
new ICT sector is far higher than that of traditional firms.
What does "financing the New Economy" mean?
We cannot talk about financing the New Economy without venture
capital and secondary financial markets immediately springing to mind.
These are the two elements behind the funding of small firms' and start-ups'
particular - because more risky - innovation. The emergence of venture
capital and secondary financial markets with more flexible access
conditions, has played a major role in supporting new tech firms.
Yet the financing of the New Economy is not just limited to venture
capital and secondary markets. The financing of UMTS, the technology that
will replace GSM in mobile telephones, can also be considered as a kind of
New Economy financing, for example, even though it is beyond the scope
of venture capital and secondary markets. 
Although difficult to define, we are nevertheless able to say that the
financing of the New Economy covers a much broader concept than
venture capital and secondary market funding. This explains why
measuring the true scale of New Economy financing is still no easy task.
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Capital Association, NVCA (4), venture capital firms in the United States
provided funds to the tune of $48.3 billion in 1999 (5), up 152% in
comparison to 1998. $18.8 billion went to the Internet sector alone,
representing 40% of total finances. The European Venture Capital
Association, EVCA (6), estimated that Eu25.2 billion was invested by VC
companies in 1999, amounting to a 74% increase compared to 1998.
Equity-type investment capital has thus become one of corporations' prime
sources of investment. 
Although venture capital financing has played a major part in the
development of the New Economy, we need to bear in mind that the New
Economy actually confirmed what was already an increasingly popular
method of corporate financing. In other words, investment capital also owes
its expansion to the New Economy, or at least in part.
There are other forms of capital-based funding. Business Angels are
probably the largest source of finance for start-ups in the United States,
especially in the early stages of their development.
With the market booming, numerous venture capital funds have become
so large that they no longer consider investing any less than $1 million,
leaving Business Angels with a greater share of the market. 
Furthermore, venture capital is expanding with the emergence of more
and more internal corporate funds. These two types of financing are not
included in the statistics, or only with a great deal of difficulty. 
While investment capital gives fledgling companies an initial boost and
helps them in part of their expansion process, the long-term objective is
either to be bought by a large group or an IPO.
Investment capital has taken advantage of the way it is perceived on
stock markets. Investors agree to pay the top price when floating
companies despite the extra risk. 
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(4) Source: http://www.nvca.org, : http://www.mercurycenter.com
(5) Source : http://www.pwcglobal.com, http://www.pwcmoneytree.com
(6) Source: http://www.evca.com, "Europe Private Equity", n° 16, July 2000.Venture capital does in fact manage to generate an attractive internal
rate of return (IRR) for investors looking for high yields and a wide-ranging
asset portfolio (induced by the drop in interest rates). Venture capital has
actually benefited from the regain in intermediary savings management
observed since 1994 with professional investors (investment funds,
retirement funds, life insurance, etc.) investing riskier assets than private
individuals.
The vibrancy of the IPO stock market, which is now taking on a more
global aspect, can also be felt in the venture capital industry. According to
Securities Data, 531 IPOs were recorded in the world in 1999 compared to
369 a year earlier. Thomson Financial claims that the figure is even higher,
with an estimated 1,134 IPOs, of which 606 were European. But the
impressive amounts of money venture capital has attracted remains
insignificant in relation to the overall sum invested in financial markets. As
we saw earlier, secondary markets were established to facilitate small
entrepreneurial companies' access to capital. 
The most well known, NASDAQ, experienced a 214% market
capitalization increase between October 1998 and April 2000. This hefty
jump can be compared to the 55% rise on S&P 500 and the 42% upturn on
Dow Jones over the same period. 
Since New Economy stocks attract scores of investors, security prices
have obviously gone sky-high. Thus, in April 2000, the price earning ratio
(PER), estimated on the basis of the projected earnings consensus for the
year, stood at 100 for the one hundred highest capitalizations on NASDAQ,
whereas it only reached 24 for S&P 500 firms. 
The tech-stock correction of spring 2000 led a number of economists to
question the validity of corporate valuations based on nothing but predicted
markets and profits. The American financial analysis consultancy, Pegasus
Research International, has identified 51 companies that may "have burnt
up all the cash they use to finance their activity" within the next 12 months.
Group valuations are still especially high in the telecommunications sector,
while the promise of growth is still way below the market average and the
visibility of mid-to-long-term profitability continues to be poor. Furthermore,
the financing of UMTS licenses has plunged these companies deeper into
debt, concurrently increasing the cost of borrowing and as a corollary, the
cost of capital. 
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characteristic of New Economy financing, namely the massive allocation of
savings to enormous, uncertain telecommunications projects. 
The astronomical sums involved (over Eu100 billion for only 5 European
countries) pose a problem of profitability for firms coming forward to acquire
these licenses. 
Will tomorrow's consumer be prepared to use and pay for the services
made available to him/her, bearing in mind that the percentage of
subscribers currently making use of services offered by operators on a
regular basis is estimated at only 2%?
A great many people think that the billions spent on obtaining UMTS
licenses is a veritable gamble on the future development of mobile
telephony, and this has left an awful lot of analysts perplexed. 
There does seem to be a specific method of financing the New Economy
therefore, which is determined by specific valuation requirements.
This financing is characterized by the need for high returns on the one
hand, resulting in more speculative trends and perhaps special risks, and
on the other hand, by arrangements that could well be qualified as
"wagers", such as the funding of UMTS. 
High growth with zero-inflation and the incredibly optimistic profit
forecasts for New Economy firms have both pushed up market valuation.
This produces financial imbalance with the creation of a financial bubble
that may well burst at some point, thus jeopardizing the positive impact of
the New Economy on growth. 
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(7) See in particular on this subject: 
- SCHAEFFER A. (2000) UMTS: Le gouvernement n’a pas le droit de vendre l’avenir d’internet
en France.
- "L’économie douteuse de la vente des licences UMTS", CDC Marchés: 2 June 2000.
- "Europe’s mobile telephony: Waves of the future", The Economist, 8 July 2000.
- "UMTS : La chasse aux licences est ouverte", Le Revenu, n° 584, 28 August 2000.    Is there a Theoretical Explanation for the Relationship
between the Financing of the New Economy and Growth?
Once we have recognized that there is a specific method of financing
the New Economy, we are faced with the question of how and in what way
can it influence growth, and of whether we are able to gain any insight on
the matter from economic theory.
The impact of the financial system on growth is a classic issue and was
first raised in 1873 by W. Bagehot. All economists have come to agree that
financial growth is a response to an increase in demand for financial
services when an economy develops, but they display differences in
opinion as regards the role of the financial system in economic growth. 
A financial system has numerous characteristics: the form of mobilizing
savings, the allocation of capital derived from savings, risk-reduction
procedures, etc. The specific trait of today's financial system is perhaps the
fixing of standards for requisite returns, as currently witnessed with the
imposition of a 15% minimum ROE on markets across the globe.
In view of the functions performed by a financial system, we are led to
believe that if it works well, this system will be able to improve the savings-
investment equilibrium. Since productivity growth has now been identified
as being the main source of expansion, we need to ask ourselves whether
the financing of the New Economy enables these productivity gains to be
optimized, and if these rises can justify the price at which assets are valued
in this sector, because this would provide us with hope for balanced and
sustainable growth. 
Classic models retain the following growth factors: the amount of capital,
the size of the workforce, technological progress and innovation. Models
measure the first two of these factors but sum up the qualitative aspects
(education, technological advance, the concentration of corporate
ownership, etc.) in the concept of residual factors. To be more precise, if
the savings rate is a variable explaining economic growth, and an increase
in this rate gives rise to a period of rapid expansion, it will no longer have
any long-term impact and will result in a standstill. Capital yields decrease,
limiting the accumulation process, and thus cancel growth spontaneously.
At this point, only technological progress is capable of maintaining the rate
of return and preventing the tendency to stagnate. Technological advance
is therefore the only element to be found in both classical and neo-classical
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included in this reflection in sofaras the former is not even considered as a
residual factor. 
We can only imagine a type of financial development having an effect on
the growth rate if it facilitates technological progress. This intuition is solely
developed within the framework of endogenous growth in which the
characteristics of the economic system being examined condition growth
rate. 
Let us now present a simple endogenous growth model (AK model,
PAGANO, 1993): 
Let g be the growth rate, which can be defined as: 
  g = Aφσ−δ
where A is capital productivity, φ the portion of savings used for investment
purposes, s the savings rate and δ the depreciation rate.
This model assumes that financial developments affect economic growth
at three levels by influencing capital productivity (A), the efficiency of the
financial system (φ ) and the savings rate (s), on the understanding that the
first two of these effects are fundamental. 
What we need to ask ourselves is whether productivity gains justify the
conditions for return on assets (ROA) in the New Economy. Putting this
more directly, we need to know whether there a danger of a financial
bubble related to New Economy stocks or not. This obviously raises the
question of new ICTs' specificity in productivity gains. 
Are the effects of technological progress spread evenly within the
economy or are they concentrated in the leading-edge sectors? We have to
find out whether or not productivity growth throughout the economy
originates mainly from gains generated by IT firms alone.
This is the theory that the American economist, R.J. GORDON (1999) put
forward in 1999 and supported with statistics. He believes that computers
have only improved productivity in the IT field and that they have had no
effect on any other sectors of the economy, even on those equipped with
new technologies on a large scale. 
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have a definite impact on factor productivity, we cannot judge in advance
what the effects on sectors "importing" productivity gains generated in this
manner will be (COHEN & DEBONNEUIL, 2000) .
This leaves us with the following question: although the disappearance
of the Solow paradox seems likely, does this necessarily mean that we
should view ICTs as the medium for rapid and stable growth? As always in
this debate, economists' opinions diverge on the question of the valuation
of new technology assets. 
  Financing the New Economy and its Real Impact on
Growth
It is imperative that we quantify the risks threatening the New Economy
when addressing the question of its specific profitability requirements. 
Is there a financial bubble related to new technology values? 
The answer is obvious: the PER more than doubled between 1995 and
2000 in the United States and in France, although in a completely
heterogeneous manner. Tech stocks rose far quicker than average,
especially on NASDAQ. We only have to look at the PER figures at the
beginning of the year to see this - on the Dow Jones market, they averaged
at 24, on the S&P 5000 at 33 and more importantly, at 48 on NASDAQ.
There is no shadow of a doubt that corporate share prices and valuations in
the new ICT sector have risen very sharply over the past five years in the
United States, and over the last year in France. 
Of course, it is easy to understand the reasons behind this price
increase in relation to the high demand for shares. Let us refer to the
thoughts of economists from the French market research group, CDC (8) on
this matter, which provide us with a list of explanatory factors: 
- demography is conducive to long-term share-based savings as baby
boomers get ready for their future retirement,
- credit is being granted very actively,
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(8) CDC Marchés, "Comment finit la hausse des valeurs technologiques ?", Flash, n° 2000-55,
21 March 2000.- banking technology is increasingly basing solvency analysis on the
measurement of the value of a person's wealth,
- the buying-back of shares by companies increases the capital-debt
ratio and thus ROE,
- the tax reform favours share ownership,
- institutional investors' poorly balanced shares at the outset.
We are thus able to espouse these economists' view that a speculative
bubble exists, particularly in relation to New Economy values. How can we
keep risk to a minimum? A great many economists have answered this
question in all kinds of different ways. Among those that reject the theory of
the New Economy, Patrick ARTUS & Michèle DEBONNEUIL (1999) defend
the idea that financial markets' high valuations can be explained by the
melding of several phenomena. To start with, the growing intermediation of
savings management increases profitability requirements. 
As a consequence, companies increase their capital-debt ratio and push
up ROE considerably, while economic profitability rises only slightly.
Furthermore, the competitive structure of the management market
generates a high demand for investment funds for risky assets and thus
lowers risk premiums. Operators' biased (optimist) market forecasts can
also be added to these two phenomena. These economists therefore
interpret high stock market valuations as complex and speculative bubbles. 
They see macro-economic consequences at two levels. Firstly, the
growth of the stock market increases borrowing capacity and brings the
savings rate down. This fuels an upturn in consumption and investment,
resulting in growth - as can be seen in the United States at present. The
second consequence - the significant increase in the gearing ratio - makes
the situation more and more fragile if a cyclical downturn should arise. If a
recession does hit the US, it will be "sudden and severe" on account of this
excessive debt and will also have a direct impact on employment (because
work is currently driving risk and not capital). This is why these economists
recommend introducing prudential regulation. 
Gérard MAAREK (2000) views things differently. He explains that "the
New Economy identifies itself with remarkable economic circumstances",
with each of its characteristic elements originating from facts related to this
particular economic climate. This means that the recent period can be
interpreted as a time of transition to an unemployment and low inflation
regime similar to the one experienced at the end of the '60s. 
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the reallocation of shares and the purchasing of shares (in an aim to
increase yield). Maarek singles out growing economic profitability as the
spark that triggered the increase in financial return, coupled with a drop in
interest rates making it possible to lower the cost of borrowing, but he
dismisses an increase in debt. 
The growth in the number of IPOs can be explained by the height of
Tobin's famous "Q" ratio, "market value over equity capital", which is well in
excess of 1. This translates into the fact that old capital is more expensive
than new capital. 
Similarly, in an environment where sources of inflation have run dry, he
finds two causes of rapid growth: the demographic shock (baby boom) and
the financial shock, via pension funds, which have increased the stock of
productive capital enabling labour productivity to rise.
Moreover, brisk growth is the source of greater purchasing power and
the zero-inflation unemployment rate (drop in the NAIRU). 
With regard to Wall Street valuations, Gérard Maarek retains two
hypotheses. Profits are forecast to grow at a rate of 16% a year and 18% in
the medium-term - although this challenges the common sense reasoning
of macro-economics - or risk premiums are low, justified by the low volatility
of the economy and the quality of the socio-political environment.
In the same way as Patrick Artus and Michèle Debonneuil, he notes that
the repercussions of a stock market crash depend on the economic agents'
state of financial fragility. While he considers that the United States has
moved from a debt economy to an equity economy, he does not however
neglect the weighty liabilities that have been pressing down on US
households and corporations since the '80s. Having said this, commercial
banks are not in debt, so an accommodating monetary policy could reduce
the effects of a collapse. 
Lastly, Edward Yardeni (9), who is very much involved in the vision of the
New Economy, gives us a more subtle analysis of the rise on NASDAQ. He
identifies two possible origins for these levels of valuation. The first of these
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(9) Sources: http://www.yardeni.com, notably: "Est-ce une bulle ?", February 2000; "Une
succession de corrections", April 2000; "Revers de fortune", April 2000; "Quelle valeur donner
à la croissance des bénéfices futurs ?", thematic study n° 49, January 2000.is that this is one bubble among many others and the second, is that it is
the consequence of a legitimate valuation of the New Economy - the latter
assumption being confirmed by 1999's Q4 profits.
Yardeni offers a middle-of-the-road analysis. Current valuations are
definitely the fruit of investors' optimistic predictions, in part, but, more than
anything else, they stem from the globe-spanning, competitive and
productive high-tech New Economy, which is now emerging rapidly with the
development of the Internet, broadband access, wireless technologies…
These are the technologies behind the use of "Net-exchanges", bringing
costs down and consequently, increasing productivity. Edward Yardeni is
therefore not convinced that there is a bubble, even though he does not
reject the hypothesis. He believes that high valuations are chiefly the result
of actual and projected profit growth rates. However, he thinks that it is
highly unlikely that a large number of "New Economy" firms will manage to
keep up such an outstanding performance. 
As far as the macro-economic consequences of current valuations are
concerned, he made the following analysis during the mini-crash in spring
2000: 
"I agree that the bullish stock market is not the classical bubble that Mr.
Greenspan described this year. I think it would be more exact to say that the very
narrow bull market of the 'New Economy' has been hiding the very wide 'Old
Economy' market since the summer of '98. What we have here is not one single
bubble within the New Economy market, but several bubbles that are all beginning
to burst, or at least are starting to deflate. I think this phase will have a salubrious
effect by blowing a bit of fresh air into the undervalued stocks of the Old Economy,
particularly in the energy, retail and finance sectors". 
Edward Yardeni makes no alarmist predictions in relation to the
consequences of a possible stock market crash. He raises the problem of
the valuation models used, and that of the Federal Reserve Bank in
particular. Although market values are not "cheap", he thinks that the FEDs
basic security valuation model overestimates immensely. Yardeni explains
that the model does not give sufficient weight to the long-term growth of
earnings and does not take account of the much higher degree of risk
associated with these shares in comparison to State bonds.
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analyses of New Economy mechanisms and interpretations of market
valuations, the impact of the New Economy, its extent and above all, the
consequences of a stock market crash, all differ. 
The speculative bubble is not the only problem. We may also wonder
about the existence of a risk threatening the real economy, for the simple
reason that nothing proves that resources are being well allocated. 
The New Economy requires capital accumulation to be increased
enormously. Of course, labour productivity is speeding up but there are no
signs of a net increase in overall factor production. This leads us to ponder
on the repercussions of the rise in capitalistic intensity, and notably the
increase in the cost of capital paid by companies, as well as on the
underlying question of the availability of the savings required to finance
necessary extra investments in the New Economy. If the Eurozone
experiences the same growth in new technology investments, it is not
certain that it will be able to attract sufficient capital to finance the New
Economy in the same way as in the US.
It is true that we often focus our attention on the financial risks of the
New Economy. However, there is also a real economic risk which is
generated by the rise in the cost of capital, the increased consumption of
fixed capital, the risk of a loss in profitability if the distribution of added
value cannot be distorted to the detriment of wages and the risk of
insufficient domestic savings.
  Conclusion
Has the New Economy engendered a new form of inflation-free growth,
allowing numerous jobs to be created on a sustainable basis? Are the
methods of financing the New Economy based on new laws, notably
justifying this sector's very specific requirements for profitability, which has
yet to be achieved in most cases? 
What we can actually see is that an overabundant credit offering and the
overoptimistic effects of the New Economy can lead to an excessive
valuation of assets - and these two mechanisms maintain each other. While
new technologies initially raise the price of assets, financial technology
accentuates the phenomenon by basing the granting of credit on the value
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their soaring prices.
This calls for our first conclusion: every reasonable economic policy
must therefore attempt to prevent the increase in asset price/ increase in
credit offer spiral.
More generally, this New Economy may be just one fragile - because
reversible - moment in the present economic cycle. As Gérard Maarek
mentions, there only has to be a roundabout turn in some of the factors for
the entire current phenomenon to move into reverse gear as well: for
example, when pension funds narrow down their staff's activities and pull
out of the stock market. Thus, from 2004-2005 onwards, the excess in
demand for shares should give way to the excess in offers, which will bring
their prices tumbling down. Until then, the re-emergence of inflation, or any
other factor that pushes up rates on a long-term basis, could bring in its
wake a severe stock market correction that would have a negative impact
on growth. The scale of the consequences of a crash will however depend
upon the state of economic agents' financial fragility, such as the level of
debt exhibited by US companies and households, evoked by certain
economists. This is why a collapse of the market would most probably bring
about a severe recession in the United States. However, the estimated
impact on the rest of the world is generally very low. The French Deposit
and Consignment Office estimates the impact of a US crisis in Europe at
only 1/4 of a point of GDP maximum. In the same manner, numerous
economists agree that improving the economic foundations of developing
countries should enable them to withstand an American recession. 
The second conclusion is that if we wish to avoid this crash, we need to
bear in mind that it is difficult to imagine any strong and global-scale
correction occurring as long as credit is being granted so dynamically
because the excess of means of payment has to be invested in assets and
traditional assets have a limited absorption capacity.
Therefore, if the credit offer falls as the result of a tighter monetary policy
or else, at the banks initiative, a proper correction of asset prices will be
able to take place. Any sudden variation in monetary policy could lead to a
recession. 
Finally, and most importantly, although the development of methods of
financing is especially conducive to innovation at present, and the ensuing
productivity gains allow us to conclude that the funding of this New
J.-H. LORENZI 55Economy has had a positive impact on growth, it is nonetheless true that
this form of finance is risky due to the rates of yield required, and
especially, because this financing is being carried out in an uncertain
context in which it is impossible to measure the risks of failure. 
Perhaps, as J.P. BETBEZE (2000) affirms: "all these means, be they
banking or markets, are inadequate when it comes to satisfying the
requirements of the New Economy", and maybe the new private equity
market is more suited to financing the New Economy since this method
probably allows valuations to follow a more mature course. 
Since this is not the case, it would appear that strong prudential
measures are called for. 
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J.-H. LORENZI 57liquidity. While it is true that at some levels, volatility leads to market
breaks, such as one seen in Chicago futures markets in October 1987, it
can be argued that in anticipatory markets volatility is a necessary condition
of liquidity, a fundamental mechanism to cope with information
disequilibrium. 
Strategic behavior
Another reason for fundamental instability of financial markets is their
structure and the resulting attitudes of market participants.
We have noted the incestuousness of financial markets. Under
information market approach, the main reason for this incestuousness is
that financial institutions are simultaneously largest producers and
consumers of financial information. This means that they are
simultaneously buyers and sellers. In technical terms, they are market-
makers, displaying to the market two-way prices, the buy price and the sell
price, the former being preferably lower than the latter.
This two-way approach reflect a fundamental ambivalence of
information: for any market participants, information is their biggest asset
but also their largest liability. They can make huge profits from the
information trading but also huge, potentially fatal losses. Thus, they
constantly grapple with major dilemmas: how much information to disclose?
How active to be in the market? How to balance aggressive information
trading and risk management? If they do not disclose their views and
information they hold, nobody will trade with them. If they disclose too
much, the size of position they hold in a given instrument, for instance,
other participants will take advantage of it, causing large losses.
Furthermore, in an information-intensive market, any advantage from
exclusive access to information is short-lived and has to be capitalized
upon quickly.
In order to cope with this dilemma and associated risks, market
participants adopt a range of strategic attitudes. Not only they constantly
look for new and more forward-looking information, they also seek to
anticipate reactions of other participants. This goes well-beyond what
Keynes described as "beauty contest" approach: in order to choose the
most beautiful girl one need to consider not only his own preference but
also that of other judges (KEYNES, 1936; ORLEAN, 1989 and THALER, 1991).
Sophisticated players are looking for second and third order derivatives and
seek manipulate the signalling aspects of their transactions.
84 COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIESIn the financial market context, greater information transparency does not
reduce the risks to the participants, to the contrary it may increase it. Thus
markets players often seek to limit transparency, to make market more
viscous, by introducing zones and periods of opacity. The viscosity is a
particular concern of marketmakers, who want to hide the size of their
positions. In foreign exchange markets, where transaction size is very large,
all prices quoted on broadcasting networks such as Reuters or Telerate are
indicative and have to be negotiated on a bilateral basis. In equity markets,
such as London Stock Exchange, price quotes displayed on public
information networks are binding up to certain quantities but, until recently,
market makers did not have to publish their large transactions. This ability to
hide position has generated considerable controversy between partisans of
transparency and marketmakers who argue that the premature disclosure
created an unacceptable risk level and therefore they would be unwilling to
engage in large transactions (London Stock Exchange, 1995).
The risk of transparency and marketmaking explains the persistence of
brokers in a market with abundant information flows, and therefore a priori
susceptible to disintermediation. Those brokers no longer intermediate
between end-clients and financial institutions but between marketmakers
(inter-dealer brokers). 
Market regulators are continuously trying to strike a right balance
between transparency and opacity but such balance appears elusive as it is
quite difficult to set hard and fast rules, applicable all the time to all markets.
Network of networks
The fact is that, in the world of global economy and geofinance, markets
remain remarkably diverse and this diversity is growing. Financial markets
should be seen as a loose set of interconnected markets rather than a
single tightly integrated market. They constitute a network of networks, a
financial equivalent of Internet. Not only, there are different markets for
different instruments, foreign exchange, bonds, equities but within single
instrument, market structures can vary considerably. For instance, within
equity markets, it is customary to distinguish between order-driven markets,
where all orders are transacted in a single market place, and quote-driven
markets, where transactions are carried out by competing market-makers.
A specific academic discipline, market microstructure analysis, has been
created to deal with the issues of various structures of equity markets
(COHEN, MALER, SCHWARTZ & WHITCOMB, 1986; GILLET & MINGUET, 1994).
C. GOLDFINGER 85The persistence of market diversity and fragmentation can be explained
by the strategic behavior of market participants seeking to preserve their
particular mix of transparency and opacity and the concerns of regulatory
authorities, who want to maintain control of markets. But it is also a
reflection of fundamentally heterogeneous nature of information.
Information should not be seen as one large and undifferentiated flow of
bits. Rather it is comprised of thousand of distinct if interrelated streams of
data, images and symbols. 
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